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Poor Ireland
In January 1988 The Economist published a survey of the Republic of Ireland.
The title was ‘Poorest of the Rich’ and it was accompanied by a young girl with
her child begging on the street. The opening lines of this survey conveyed an
almost Beckettian bleakness:
“Take a tiny, open ex-peasant economy. Place it next door to a much larger one, from
which it broke away with great bitterness barely a lifetime ago. Infuse it with a
passionate desire to enjoy the same lifestyle as its former masters, but without the
same industrial heritage of natural resources. Inevitable result: extravagance,
frustration debt...Ireland is easily the poorest country in rich north-west Europe. Its
gross domestic product is a mere 64% of the European Community average”.
Less than ten years later the Economist highlighted Ireland on its front cover
with the title ‘Europe’s shining light’. In the lead editorial it remarked:
“Just yesterday, it seems, Ireland was one of Europe’s poorest countries. Today it is
about as prosperous as the European average, and getting richer all the time”. (The
Economist, May 17, 1997, 15)
The Irish economy’s current performance is most impressive. High and
sustained economic growth, low inflation, a current account balance of
payments surplus, falling unemployment, net immigration and a growing
budget surplus are the stuff of macroeconomists’ dreams. All the key
macroeconomic indicators are positive. Ireland, traditionally a laggard behind
the U.K. economy, has now a per capita GDP which exceeds that of the U.K.
The metaphor, the Celtic Tiger, first coined by Morgan Stanley in August 1994,
has become the fashionable neologism for the Irish economy. Many articles
have been written about the Celtic Tiger as commentators highlight the
transformation of the Irish economy. These articles have been followed by
books - Barry (1999), Gray (1997) and Sweeney (1998).
Theorists have examined the phenomenon wondering if the Irish
performance can be modeled and explained by the new growth theory. How can
a country with a very sluggish growth performance move to a high growth path
so quickly? How can a country with chronic budget deficits and a high level of
indebtedness suddenly become one with a rising budget surplus and a low level
of indebtedness? How can a country with a very high level of unemployment
and net emigration be transformed into one with close to full employment and
net immigration? The Irish economy, as it moves towards the millennium, is
fascinating not only because of the extent of the transformation of its growth
performance, but, also, by the speed of the transformation. Indeed the speed of
the transformation provides part of the answer to in explaining the Irish
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The theme of this paper is that it is wrong to over ascribe to Ireland some
unique magical qualities, some potion magique that transformed it from a low
performance economy to the Celtic Tiger. Ireland’s transformation, one
primarily caused by multi-nationals, was facilitated by the phenomenon of
globalisation and in particular the shifting closer together of two economic
tectonic plates that of the United States and the European Union. Ireland, at the
geographic periphery of the latter, but, as the closest European ethnic partner of
the former - remembering that 40 million U.S. citizens are of Irish extraction -
has flourished, rather than been crushed, by the inner shifts of these economic
plates. The geographic factor, albeit between Ireland and the U.K., which was
identified by The Economist as the cause of the problem in 1987, suddenly
becomes part of the explanation behind the surge in growth in the 1990s.
 Globalisation enabled Ireland to move from the periphery towards the
centre of the new global economy. Now Ireland is the second largest exporter of
packaged computer software in the world after the United States, twelve of
Fortune’s top twenty electronic companies and all of its top ten pharmaceutical
companies have plants in Ireland. From having virtually no major export
industries (Guinness and Irish whiskey representing two exceptions) Ireland has
become a significant platform for U.S. high-tech companies competing in the
European market.
In this new global economy, or more specifically, this Euro-US economy,
is it sensible to talk of core and periphery, to discuss convergence and catch up?
These were terms that were appropriate in the industrialised world where
transport and communication costs conferred benefits to countries at the core
and where investment from core economies could gradually help peripheral
countries to converge towards them. In the post-industrial high-tech world core
and periphery have become anachronistic. There is, in the words of Paul
Krugman, a new economic geography.
This new economic geography flips traditional theory on its head.
Convergence, at least in Irish terms, needs to be replaced by leap-frog because
Ireland has successfully moved from the equivalent of a donkey-and-cart
economy to a high-tech economy by leap-frogging over the intermediate hump
of industrialisation. Indeed, it will be argued that the absence of a large
industrial base actually helped Ireland in that it enabled the government to
provide significant tax advantages which would have been difficult, if not
impossible, to make if a large industrial base already existed. Furthermore the
lack of industrialisation meant the absence of obsolete capital and rigid labour
practices. Ireland was not to follow the path of industrialisation. Instead an
alternative path emerged, a high-tech path configurated by a different economic
terrain.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 5
The Irish case raises issues as to whether other pre-industrial countries
can be transformed to post- industrial economies and whether it can be done as
speedily as the Irish case.
The Economist’s article of 1987, though harsh, was realistic. Ireland was
a poor struggling economy. Table 1 shows that economic growth had averaged
0.2% over the previous five years during which time there were three years of
negative economic growth. Unemployment amounted to 18% of the labour
force, and the national debt amounted to 125% of GNP. Some commentators
were comparing Ireland to a heavily indebted banana republic.
When did all this change? Paradoxically many identify 1987 as the take-
off year for the economy, when a policy of fiscal retrenchment was introduced,
to correct the economy from the excesses of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Even here, as will be explained later, the forces for change were global rather
than specifically domestic. But while 1987 ushered in some hope with good
growth in GNP registered for 1987, 1989 and 1990, the familiar pessimistic
refrains were heard between 1991/93. This may be seen by examining the
growth in GNP and the growth in employment since 1987:














The period 1991-93 produced little that was spectacular in terms of economic
growth with the total number of people at work actually falling in 1991.High
interest rates associated with the exchange rate crises that hit the European
Union countries in 1992/3 severely dampened demand. The old questions
started to be asked once again. Where was the country heading? Even though
employment had grown by some 72,000 between 1988 and 1993 unemployment
was 3,000 greater at 220,000.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 6
Suddenly everything changed and the change was dramatic. From 1994
there has been a period of sustained growth in GNP and in employment. GNP
growth has averaged 7.5% in the six years between 1994-1999 (GDP growth
has averaged 8.4%), employment has grown by over 390,000 and
unemployment is expected to average just 6% in 1999. The public sector deficit
has moved into substantial surplus and the national debt/GNP ratio now below
60% is half what it had been in 1987. Domestic demand is strong and there is
an effervescence effect running through all forms of expenditure ranging from
new car sales to house purchases. Table 1 shows the extent of the contrast
between the growth of the second half of the 1990s with the experience of
growth in the 1980s. So why has there been this transformation? Why has the
economy moved to a very high and sustained growth performance?
A Short Primer on Ireland’s Recent Economic History
In order to explain the new economic configuration and how a predominantly
pre-industrial economy leap-froged to a post-industrial high-tech economy so
abruptly it is first necessary to outline some of Ireland’s recent economic
history. Using a broad brush the following periods may be identified:
•   1922-32 - The first decade of independence marked by a continuation
of existing policies. In 1927 an independent Irish currency was
established but kept at a one-to-one parity with sterling.
•   1932-38 - The era of protectionism. There was an economic war with
the U.K. and an attempt to build infant industries behind high tariff
walls. The Control of Manufactures Acts were introduced prohibiting
the ownership of Irish industry by foreigners.
•   1939-45 - World War II during which Ireland remained neutral.
•   1946-57 - The period of economic stagnation marked by heavy
emigration - net emigration averaging over 40,000 during the 1950s.
•   1957 - The removal of the Control of Manufactures Act.
•   1973 - Ireland joined the European Economic Community.
•   1977-81 - Expansionary macroeconomic policy used in an attempt to
provide full employment. This policy, which resulted in the Public
Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) constituting over 20% of
GNP, failed creating balance of payments problems and pushed the
public sector debt up to 120% of GNP. Paradoxically, during this
period of fiscal excess, Ireland joined the European Monetary System
in 1978.
•   1979 - As a result of joining the ERM of the EMS the Irish pound’s
one-to-one parity with sterling was broken in March 1979.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 7
•   1981-86 - Attempts at fiscal retrenchment largely aborted by conflicts
amongst the partners of the Coalition governments of the period.
•   1987 - Fiscal retrenchment introduced. The International Financial
Services Centre launched.
•   1988 - The first tax amnesty. This helped to reduce significantly the
budget deficit and the PSBR.
•   1992 - Single European Market. Ireland signed up for the first phase
of EMU at Maastricht. Abolition of exchange control regulations.
•   1992/3 - Exchange rate crises. Devaluation of the Irish pound
(January 1993) and move to wider exchange rate bands (15%+/-)
•   1999 - Ireland in the EMU.
The above is not a comprehensive listing of the events which helped to shape
the Irish economy in the twentieth century but it does show a number of
important issues: (1) the fluctuating openness of the economy; (2) the recourse
to independent policies to solve economic problems; (3) the growing
Europeanisation of the Irish economy.
The Openness of the Irish Economy
An economic mantra, familiar to students, consists of the statement Ireland is a
small open economy. The smallness element does not need discussion. Ireland’s
GDP constitutes about 1% of the European Union’s GDP. It is the third smallest
of the OECD economies, ahead of only Iceland and Luxembourg. The openness
issue is different for Ireland has had varying degrees of openness since 1922 as
may be seen from table 2. In the first ten years of independence the Irish
economy continued its free trading relationship with the U.K. Its banking
system was closely linked to that of the U.K. and even when the Irish pound
was established in 1927 it was decided to maintain a one-to-one parity with
sterling. Irish labour moved freely to the U.K. and U.S. and capital moved
freely between Ireland and the U.K.
When Mr. De Valera assumed office in 1932 the openness of the Irish
economy was sharply reduced, both with respect to commodities and capital.
Commodity openness was considerably lowered by the economic war with the
U.K. and the attempt to build up infant industries behind high tariff walls.
While the economic war finished in 1938, many tariffs were kept in place in the
continuing effort to build up infant industries.
An even more significant legacy of that period was the continuation of
the Control of Manufactures Act which was first introduced in 1932. The
Control of Manufactures Acts 1932 and 1934 prohibited foreign ownership ofRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 8
Irish industry by stipulating that Irish people had to control 51% of the voting
shares in manufacturing companies. Effectively this ensured that foreign capital
would not move into the Irish economy. These acts continued until their
removal in 1957. Though it could be argued that there was no great reason for
foreign companies to invest in Ireland between 1932 and 1957, the Acts
suggested that, even if they contemplated such action, they were not welcome.
As O Gráda noted ‘Fianna Fáil [the governing party] sought to reserve the
domestic market for Irish capital’ (O Gráda, 1994 : 407).
Paradoxically, Irish capital was free to move out of Ireland - at least to
the Sterling Area. Capital outflows from Ireland were endemic in the 1940s and
1950s as the banking sector invested a considerable portion of its deposits in
external assets such as British government securities. With foreign capital
prohibited from investing in the manufacturing sector and the Irish banking
system investing largely outside the economy it was not surprising to see little
economic development in Ireland during the 1940s and 1950s. The cost of this
lack of development was a stagnant economy which missed out on the
European post-war boom and net annual emigration of over 40,000 during the
1950s.
The abolition of the Control of Manufactures Acts in 1957 signaled the
beginning of a new approach aimed at welcoming foreign capital into Ireland.
In 1958 Dr. T.K. Whittaker, the secretary of the Department of Finance,
produced a report Economic Development which was highly critical of the
infant industry argument and proposed encouraging foreign capital with tax
concessions and other incentives. Moves towards free trade were initiated
through the signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 1965 and
Ireland’s joining of the EEC in 1973.
Joining the EEC marked the first step in the reduction of Ireland’s close
links with the U.K. economy. This process was accelerated by Ireland’s
decision to join the European Monetary System in 1978, a decision that led to
the breaking of the one-to-one parity with sterling in 1979. The process was
further accelerated with the decision to move towards European Monetary
Union by signing up to the Maastricht Agreement in 1992 and full commitment
to join EMU, which Ireland did in January 1999, even though it was known that
its largest trading partner was not committed to monetary union.
This process of Europeanisation had significant implications for capital
movements. The break in the exchange rate link in 1979 heralded the start of an
enforced floating exchange rate with sterling. The Irish pound newly linked
with the currencies of the ERM floated against sterling according as the
European currencies fluctuated against sterling. In an effort to protect the Irish
currency the Central Bank, in 1979, introduced exchange control regulationsRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 9
limiting capital transactions outside the Sterling Area! However, the growing
commitment to European Monetary Union, led to the dismantling of these
exchange control regulations in the early 1990s. With the abolition of the last
vestiges of these exchange control regulations in 1992 and the introduction of
the Single European Market the Irish economy had become a fully open
economy, not only for commodities and labour but, also, for capital.
The immediate consequences of this full openness produced a strong
deflationary period for the economy in 1992/3. The sterling devaluation of the
late summer of 1992, Ireland’s continued identification with the U.K. link and
the weakness of the other ERM currencies led to a period of continued
speculative attacks against the currency. In an attempt to defend the currency
the Irish authorities pushed up domestic interest rates to very high levels, an
action which considerably dampened domestic demand. Full openness initially
produced high interest rates and depressed domestic demand. The move to
wider ERM exchange rate bands in August 1993 and the commitment to EMU
were successful in removing these exchange rate pressures and their
implications for interest rates. The more stable exchange rate environment post
1993 along with the growing confidence that interest rates would fall to
German levels as European Monetary Union approached were key elements in
assisting the very sizeable growth in domestic demand which has been
manifestly evident in the economy since then. Using as the criterion for
openness the ratio of the sum of export and import values to GDP Ireland is the
second most open economy in the OECD with imports and exports constituting
more than 1.7 times GDP in 1997.
Openness and Independent Policies
The failure to understand the significance of the openness of the economy to the
international economy led to important domestic policy failures. The first of
these failures, as shown above, was the closure of the economy in the 1930s,
one legacy of which was the continued prohibition on foreign capital
investment until 1957. This resulted in a neglect of the role of international
capital in fostering economic growth.
The second openness related policy failure was that of the period 1977-
81 when there was an attempt to force growth on the domestic economy without
consideration of the balance of payments consequences triggered by these
growth led policies. The view of the government at the time was that fiscal
pump priming, arising through a combination of tax cuts and increased
government expenditure, would push the economy to a high growth path and
eventual full employment. This was an uncritical approach to Keynesian
macroeconomic policy - the policymakers having failed to read Keynes’sRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 10
cautionary views on expansionary policy in an open economy which he
elaborated in the ‘Notes on Mercantilism’ in The General Theory of
Employment Interest and Money (1936). To finance the high and growing
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) the government resorted to
substantial domestic and foreign borrowing. This policy helped to promote a
certain amount of short term growth as may be seen from table 1. However, the
policy did not take into account Ireland’s high marginal propensity to import
which resulted in most of the budgetary stimuli exiting on imports. The increase
in importss in turn caused the balance of payments to move into substantial
deficit. By 1981 the balance of payments deficit was running at 14.6% of GNP
(as against 5.3% in 1977) and inflation was 20.4% at a time when the U.K.’s
inflation rate was 11.9% and the EU average 12%.
Ireland’s growing macroeconomic crisis was not addressed immediately.
Though politicians were prepared to use retrenchment rhetoric they were not
prepared to support this rhetoric with appropriate economic policies. This in
part was due to the coalition mix of the Fine Gael/Labour governments which
governed for the period June 1981 to February 1987 except for the short period
of Fianna Fáil rule between February and November 1982. The failure of the
macroeconomic policy to redress the situation may be seen by the absence of
economic growth between 1982-86 and from the growing burden of
government indebtedness which reached 125% of GNP in 1987, over 50% of
which was held externally.
1987 was to prove a crucial year in Ireland’s recent economic history.
The new Fianna Fáil government, which had committed itself in the general
election to increasing public expenditure, turned volte face and committed itself
to fiscal retrenchment. Notwithstanding the electioneering excesses this change
was recognised as necessary by most people. Honohan (1999) suggests that ‘the
real fear was of a financial meltdown with foreign and domestic financial
market refusal to rollover debt’. The new commitment to fiscal retrenchment
was epitomised by Fine Gael, the chief opposition party, promising not to
precipitate an election providing the appropriate fiscal measures were
undertaken by the government. For once at a critical juncture in the country’s
history there was a consensus on the appropriate economic policy to follow.
    A third policy failure relating to the openness issue was the initial
unwillingness to recognise that the abolition of the exchange control
regulations in the early 1990s left the economy open to speculative foreign
exchange attacks. Ireland’s commitment to Europeanisation meant that the
authorities felt obliged to maintain the exchange rate in the narrow ERM bands
even after sterling had been devalued in August 1993. This commitment
provided speculators, both Irish and foreign, with a certain one way bet against
the Irish currency. In order to defend the currency the authorities resorted to an
expensive policy of protecting it through high interest rates. These high interestRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 11
rates stifled domestic demand in the second half of 1992 and the first half of
1993. The short term costs of Ireland’s increased openness were evident in
1992/3 but the benefits of this increased openness, particularly the process of
Europeanisation, were also about to manifest themselves.
The Growing Europeanisation of the Irish Economy
In discussing the growing Europeanisation of the Irish economy it is helpful to
highlight some of the most important dates in this process:
•   1973 - Ireland joined the EEC
•   1978 - Ireland joined the EMS
•   1979 - The break in the one-to-one parity with sterling consequent on
commitments to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Monetary System.
•   1987 - Fiscal retrenchment forced on the authorities by fear of of
financial markets refusing to rollover debt.
•   1990 - Dismantling of exchange control regulations.
•   1992 - Ireland became part of the Single European Market.
•   1992/3 - Breakdown of narrow-band ERM of the EMS.
•   1997/8 - Harmonisation of Irish interest rates to German interest rates.
•   1999 - European Monetary Union.
Europeanisation has been a key element in the transformation of the Irish
economy. The trend towards Europeanisation began in 1973 when Ireland
joined the European Economic Community. The benefits to Ireland’s ailing
agricultural sector were obvious and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
provided farmers with guaranteed prices for many of their products. Ireland also
soon became adept at encouraging inflows of European structural and cohesion
funds. Barry (1999) recently suggested that European Union structural funds
may have raised Ireland’s GNP to a level of 4 per cent above what it would
otherwise have been. Furthermore, during the 1990s it contributed ‘only half of
one percentage point of the per annu, growth of GNP’. But while Ireland
became skilled at taking money from Europe there was still some way to go to
learn the other side to the European story, namely the need to adopt a lower
inflationary profile and to accept stronger fiscal discipline in order to progress
the EEC towards greater integration. Germany had spearheaded the low
inflation/fiscal discipline approach and its chancellor Helmut Schmidt was
instrumental, along with France’s president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, in
launching, in 1978, the European Monetary System, as an intermediate stage,
towards reaching the target of European Monetary Union.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 12
Paradoxically, Ireland committed itself to joining the exchange rate
mechanism of the EMS in 1978 at the very time when it had embarked on a
policy of fiscal abandon. The main reason given for joining the EMS, even
though its main trading partner the U.K. opted out of the new exchange rate
mechanism, was the aspiration that the anchoring of the currency to a D.Mark
bloc would lower the inflation rate. The underlying economic contradiction of
committing Ireland to the EMS whilst simultaneously pursuing a policy of
excessive fiscal and monetary expansion did not seem to register on the
political leaders of the time. Instead the breaking of the one-to-one parity with
sterling, the inevitable consequence of joining the ERM, in March 1979
occupied their attention with the new exchange rate policy perceived to
represent some type of national virility symbol. Ireland had come of age, it was
felt in some circles, because it had apparently shown that its currency was no
longer inextricably linked to sterling. The púnt was born. Though the initial
anti-inflation assumptions behind this move became quickly dated as sterling,
due to its enhanced petro-currency status, strengthened and the D.Mark
weakened, the 1978 decision represented an important step in the orientation of
the Irish economy. Ireland was committing itself to the Continental European
countries and attempting to reduce its dependency on the U.K. This policy was
not to have an immediate pay-off. However, it did mean that when the move to
European Monetary Union gathered momentum at Maastricht there was a type
of seamless policy for the government of the day to follow. Ireland had
committed itself to this policy in 1978. Maastricht was just a continuation of
this policy which would lead to Ireland becoming part of the new monetary bloc
when it fully evolved.
This commitment to Europeanisation was very much in contrast to the
United Kingdom which continued to draw its sterling tail in and out of the
monetary union negotiations.
How Europeanisation and Globalisation Coalesced to Benefit the Irish
Economy
During the shift in Ireland’s economic tectonic plate towards Europe there was
an even more significant movement towards each other of the US and European
Union’s economic plates due to globalisation. Silicon Valley was starting to
invade Europe producing in the process a dramatic technological revolution.
Think back ten years ago when most people did not have a portable computer, a
mobile phone, user friendly computer programmes and access to the Internet.
These are now part of the everyday working tools of people in developed
economies, tools which have dramatically changed our concepts of economic
geography. These tools of the new high-tech age have broken down distance.
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which is on the periphery of Europe, may run a business in Prague selling
services to New York, Frankfurt and Tokyo without moving outside his white-
washed thatched cottage. The periphery disappears in this high-tech world once
the region concerned has good telecommunication facilities.
In this new high-tech world US multi-nationals needed to have a
European base from which they could sell their commodities. The creation of
the Single European Market and the plan for the move to monetary union via
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 increased the urgency for MNCs to seek locations
in Europe.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s Ireland was well positioned to attract a
considerable part of the US MNCs’ business. Why? The first reason was that
the Industrial Development Authority had targeted in the 1970s and 1980s
emerging MNCs, particularly in high-tech sectors such as computers, computer
software, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. The U.S. multi-nationals’ platform
had already been partially moved into Ireland. By the early 1990s the high-tech
revolution in these areas had gathered considerable momentum with the advent
of sophisticated and user friendly computer programmes, portable computers,
CDs, mobile telephones, Internet facilities and a wide range of new
pharmaceutical products.
The new MNCs were attracted to Ireland by very low corporate tax rates
- initially a zero per cent corporate tax rate on the profits of manufactured
exports, and, later, a 10% corporate tax rate on manufacturing profits and
internationally traded services profits. Ireland was able to offer these attractive
tax facilities because of the absence of a well established industrial sector
already paying substantial corporate taxes. Ireland’s lack of industrialisation,
the problem which had restrained the economy in previous decades, suddenly
became a plus factor in that it enabled the government to provide tax facilities
to MNCs which were not possible in mature industrialised economies. Imagine
the budget deficit that would be created if France or Germany attempted to
introduce a 10% corporate tax rate. U.S. MNCs were primarily attracted to
Ireland by the low tax regime and the transfer pricing possibilities raised by
such low tax rates.
Secondly, Ireland was able to advertise to US MNCs that it was both
English speaking but, also, unlike the other English speaking member (the
U.K.), fully committed to the Europeanisation process. The U.K.’s hesitancy on
this issue came to the fore in 1992 when sterling broke away from the ERM and
decided to float independently relative to the EMS currencies. This hesitancy
was then transformed into a reluctance to progress on the EMU issue with the
U.K. voting to opt out of the arrangement. The current strong anti-European
stance in the Conservative Party along with the Labour Party’s reluctance toRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 14
allow EMU membership to become an electoral issue has left the U.K. as the
country on Europe’s periphery rather than Ireland. US MNCs looking for a
platform to sell into Europe have in many cases decided to locate in the English
speaking country that is part of the Euro rather than in the English speaking
country that appears to want to distance itself from the Euro.
Ireland with its low corporate tax rates, its young English speaking and
increasingly computer literate labour force, along with its full participation in
Europe through the Single European Market and the European Monetary
Union, was ideally positioned to act as the pontoon linking the US high-tech
companies to the European Union. The OECD’s recent report on the Irish
economy noted that ‘US investment in Ireland tripled from 1991 to 1993, just at
the time the SEM programme was being implemented’ (1999 : Note 45). There
were ‘demonstration effects’ in that the favorable experience of the initial group
of MNCs encouraged their competitors to follow them into Ireland. For some
Americans Ireland has become the fifty first state. McCarthy (1999) shows that
U.S. direct investment in Ireland averaged around 2.75% of GNP between 1994
and 1998. Krugman (1998 : 43) points out that US foreign direct investment in
Ireland is 50 percent higher per capita than in the U.K. and six times as high as
in France or Germany. In 1997 Ireland ‘ranked fifth in the world as a
destination for US direct investment outflows’. (OECD, 1999 : 12)
From this perspective it is the contention of this paper that the Celtic
Tiger is a misnomer. It is more accurate to look at it as a predominantly U.S.
high-tech multi-national tiger nurtured in a special Irish tax reserve which is
part of the united states of Europe. A considerable part of the economic growth
witnessed in Ireland is U.S. growth that was waiting to happen somewhere in
Europe. Ireland has been able to appropriate and harness this U.S. led growth to
fuel its domestic economy. Put another way if the major U.S. MNCs and the
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) were to close down in Ireland
would the boom continue? It is highly doubtful.
The MNCs and the Irish Economy
It is the theme of this paper that the high tech multi-national companies
(MNCs) have been the sine qua non behind Ireland’s high growth performance.
Furthermore the MNCs growth element has been moved up many extra gears by
the closer linking of the European-U.S. economic tectonic plates in the 1990sRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 15
In this part of the paper it is intended to:
1.  Examine the size and influence of the high-tech MNCs on the
manufacturing sector.
2.  Calculate the size of high-tech MNC exports.
3.  Present a model which highlights the ways in which the MNCs
influence the Irish economy.
The Size and Influence of the High-Tech MNC Tiger on the Manufacturing
Sector
A great deal of the activity of the high-tech MNCs in Ireland may be captured





e)  Cola concentrates
Using the Census of Industrial Production for the years 1993 to 1996 table 3
shows net output, employment and net output per person of the five selected
foreign owned high tech sectors in manufacturing. It also shows the total
foreign and total Irish and foreign output, employment and net output per
person statistics for each of these years.
In 1993 the selected high tech five high tech MNCs produced net
manufacturing output of £5 billion which constituted 43% of total net
manufacturing output with only 11% of manufacturing employment. By 1994
they were producing 46% of total net output with only 12% of manufacturing
employment. In 1995 this had jumped to 52% of total net output with only 13%
of manufacturing employment. In 1996 the selected five high tech MNC sectors
were producing £9.6 billion of net output. This amounted to 53% of net output
with a labour force of only 32,044 workers which constituted only 14% of the
total labour force engaged in manufacturing activity.
Table 3 shows the extent to which Irish manufacturing activity and its
rate of growth is influenced by a small group of MNCs in the high-tech sectors,
companies such as Boston Scientific, Coca Cola, 3 Com, Dell, Gateway, IBM,
Intel, Hewlett Packard, Macintosh, Microsoft, Motorola, Northern Telecom,
Pepsi, Pfizer, Schering Plough, etc. When the other foreign owned companies
are added to these selected high-tech companies it may be seen that foreign
owned companies controlled 77% of net manufacturing output in 1996 (up from
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In three years, and these were the three years (1994,1995 and 1996) in
which the ‘tiger’ really appeared to manifest itself, the high tech MNCs
increased their net output by £4.5 billion, an increase of 88%. The other foreign
companies increased their net output by £1.2 billion, an increase of 37%.
However, over the same period, Irish owned manufacturing companies
increased their net output by only £741 million, an increase of 22%.
The story that emerges from analysing the manufacturing data is as
follows. There has been very strong growth in manufacturing output in the
1990s but the bulk of this growth may be attributed to a small group of MNCs
who are employing only 18% of the manufacturing labour force. Take these
high-tech companies out of the manufacturing equation and the manufacuturing
performance is a great deal less impressive.
Output Per Employee
The relatively sluggish performance of the Irish owned companies compared to
the high tech MNCs is further exemplified by the comparisons between the net
output per person for the U.S. owned MNCs and the Irish owned companies in
each of the five high tech sectors:
U.S. Owned Companies Irish Owned Companies
(Net Output per Person) (Net Output per Person)
Chemicals £926,000 £75,000
Cola Concentrates £845,000 £37,000
Computer Software £628,000 £52,000
Pharmaceuticals £182,000 £40,000
Computers £116,000 £29,000
The very wide discrepancies in output per employee in the U.S. owned high
tech MNC sectors against those recorded by Irish companies in these same
sectors shows the danger of using aggregated statistics to assess Irish labour
productivity. The MNCs output performance is bloating the output statistics
and giving a very false reading of the real underlying output of Irish workers.
Observe the recent comments of authors such as Paul Krugman on Irish
productivity “Between 1979 and 1995 labour productivity in Ireland’s business
sector rose 3.3% percent per year - more than twice as fast as the G7
average...Given the combination of good productivity growth and wage
restraint, the success of the economy is in a macro sense not hard to explain.”
1
If Professor Krugman had filtered out the huge artificially generated
‘productivity gains’ of the high tech MNCs he would have found a very
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different story emerging. He is attributing U.S. workers’ productivity gains to
Irish workers and, explaining part of the Irish economic success by reference to
a set of Irish output data which is unreliable because of the transfer pricing
policies of the high tech MNCs.
The OECD’s 1995 report on the Irish economy highlighted the dual
nature of the Irish manufacturing sector noting ‘...measures of international
competitiveness for Ireland have to take into account the dual nature of the
manufacturing sector. High productivity growth in the modern sector does not
improve competitiveness in the traditional sector. Consequently, for
manufacturing industry as a whole, competitiveness measures have to be based
on relative movements of wages.’
2
Transfer Pricing
 How do such wide discrepancies emerge between the output per employee in
high tech MNCs and that produced in Irish owned companies? Are the Irish
workers in the high tech MNCs a new breed of super-performing workers? How
can they be producing nine times more output than their counterparts in
domestically owned companies? The answer lies in the power of the
accountant’s pen and the scope that globalisation gives him/her to transfer
productivity gains from high tax to low tax environments.
 Sotto voce the term transfer pricing enters the discussion. It is contended
that the differences in output per head between the high tech MNCs and Irish
owned companies is indicative of the extent to which the MNCs are involved in
transfer pricing activities. Because of Ireland’s low rate of corporation tax on
manufactured goods and financial services (10%) it is in the interests of the
MNCs to attribute very high levels of output to their Irish based plants. In this
way growth that is for the most part produced by workers in the United States is
attributed by corporate accountants to Irish workers for tax reasons. The
National Economic and Social Council explained the problem in 1992:
There can be little doubt but that the productivity data for Irish
manufacturing industry are artificially inflated by transfer pricing practices
carried out by some multi-national corporations. The objective of transfer
pricing is to optimise the global distribution of profits within a multinational
organisation, so as to minimise the overall corporate tax bill. In practice, this
means locating as much as possible of the company’s global profits in a low tax
location, such as Ireland. This can be done by pricing inputs at less than arms
length price and/or valuing outputs at more than the market price. The effect of
this would be to raise the net output figures for the manufacturing sector
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(because the profit element is contained in this component of manufacturing
output), and to raise recorded productivity levels (because this is measured in
terms of output per employee).
3
 Transfer pricing, produced by the tax skills of corporate accountants,
metamorphoses the U.S. high tech ‘tiger’ into an Irish worker who is then
misrepresented by the local and world media as the ‘Celtic Tiger’. This
misrepresentation may be more clearly seen by examining the high-tech MNCs
exports.
High-Tech MNCs Exports
 As is the case with the production statistics a great deal of the export story may
be explained by isolating the five main areas of high tech MNC exports. These
are (1) soft drinks concentrates (cola concentrates, etc) classified under
‘miscellaneous edible products’; (2) chemicals - classified under ‘organic
chemicals’; (3) medical and pharmaceutical products; (4) computers - classified
as ‘office/data processing machinery’ and (5) computer software - classified
under ‘recorded media’.
  Calculating the overall level of these high tech MNCs exports is a
difficult exercise. It means delving into the Byzantine labyrinth of the official
trade statistics where exports are classified by international customs
classifications rather than by more rational economic criteria. Export
classifications for small, insignificant, and in some cases historically outdated
products are deemed sufficiently important for separate headings whereas
computer software and cola concentrates, which are very sizeable export
categories, are not specifically referred to in the trade statistics!
 Table 4 presents exports under the five selected MNC high tech sectors,
along with remaining exports, from 1988 to 1996.These five sectors, listed in
table 4, produced 36% of Irish merchandise exports in 1988. Their share of total
merchandise exports rose to 39% in 1989, staying at 39% in 1990 and actually
declining to 38% in 1991. It rose to 40% in 1992 and then jumped to 46% in
1993. It recorded a further increase in 1995 rising from 47% to 50%. Using the
official trade statistics it appears that the high tech exports share of total
merchandise exports fell back to 49% of total exports in 1996. This was solely
due to the re-classification of certain cola concentrates and computer software.
By adding £400 million to ‘miscellaneous edible products’ (cola concentrates)
and £300 million to ‘recorded media’ (computer software) the revised total for
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high tech exports amounted to £15,507 million in 1996 - just over 50% of total
exports.
 Table 5 shows the rate of growth of exports of these five sectors and the
rate of growth of other exports since 1988. The pattern of growth shows some
very sizeable jumps in computer software - 36.5% (1989), 56.5% (1994), 54.8%
(1995); organic chemicals - 34.4% (1989), 31.1% (1993), 30.4% (1994);
medical and pharmaceutical equipment 33.8% (1989), 28.5% (1994), 32.4%
(1996); office/data processing machinery 28.2% (1989), 39.7% (1993) and
40.7% (1995).
 Between 1988 and 1996 the high tech MNC export sectors increased
exports from £4.4 billion to £15.5 billion (my revised estimate), a growth of
almost 250 per cent. The remaining export sectors increased exports from £7.9
billion to £14.9 billion, an increase of 89%. These statistics reveal the very
significant expansion in exports by the high tech MNCs and the extent of their
domination of the rate of growth of total exports.
 Just as was the case with the manufacturing output statistics prudence
needs to be exercised in their interpretation. Take the case of computer
software. A new computer programme discovered in Silicon Valley may be re-
packaged and exported to infinity out of Ireland via the Internet. To what extent
do the resulting export statistics - indeed they are now reclassified into
‘invisibles’ in the balance of payments accounts - reflect Irish inputs rather than
the creative pen of the multi-national accountant?
  The extent of this profit repatriation may be seen by analysing the
outflow of dividend payments, distribution of profits, and reinvested earnings
from Ireland. Table 6 shows that the total of these payments amounted to £2.6
billion in 1990. By 1998 they had risen to £9.3 billion, an increase of nearly
260%. This outflow constituted 16% of GDP. Examination of table 6 shows the
extent to which the rate of growth of these outflows has increased in recent
years, particularly 1995, 1997 and 1998.
A Model of the MNC’s Impact
Critics maintain that my position in highlighting the role of the multi-nationals
is excessive. They show that there have been noticeable gains in employment
most of which have not originated in the multi-national sector. They highlight
the growth in the services sector as evidence of the vitality of the overall
economy. They point out some of the new indigenous domestic companies that
have spun-off the MNCs. All of these points are correct, but, ultimately, in my
opinion, the Irish success story always reverts back to the role of the MNCs. If
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camp out of Ireland the economy would encounter considerable difficulties.
Employment would fall dramatically as accountants, builders, hoteliers,
restauranteurs, solicitors, etc found there was a reduced demand for their
services. Property prices would move sharply downwards resulting in sharp
cutbacks in employment in the construction industry. Tax revenues would
plummet. These potential effects may be more clearly seen by presenting a
small model of the way in which the MNCs affect the macroeconomy.
Chart 1 presents a model showing the way in which the MNCs influence
economic activity in Ireland. It outlines the following four primary areas
through which the MNCs influence economic activity:
1.  Exports
2.  Gross Domestic Product
3.  Employment
4.  Taxes.
The effects of MNCs’ activities in these four primary areas, in turn, create spill-
over and feedback effects to other sectors of the economy as may be seen from
chart 1. The growth in exports exercises a strong influence on the growth rate of
GDP. It also has had a positive effect on the balance of payments generating a
balance of trade surplus. Part of this surplus is offset on the balance of
payments on current account through the increase in net factor income outflows
caused by profit repatriation of the MNCs. In the pre-EMU period the balance
of payments surpluses improved foreign financial institutions’ perceptions of
the Irish exchange rate. A strong exchange rate in turn influenced positively the
inflation rate and also fed into interest rate expectations.
  Chart 1 suggests that the MNCs have direct and indirect effects on
employment. They directly increase employment in the manufacturing sector.
Indirectly, they boost employment in the services sector by generating an
increased demand for a wide variety of services. This increased employment
generates increased tax revenue through more buoyant direct and indirect taxes.
They also increase significantly the level of corporation tax. These tax effects
have greatly improved the budgetary situation which in turn has caused a
dramatic improvement in the national debt/GNP ratio.
  Isolating these effects in greater detail is a more difficult task. The
effects of the high-tech MNCs on exports has been shown on table. There it was
demonstrated that by selecting just five of the high tech sectors it may be shown
that they were producing over 50% of the merchandise exports. In an earlier
paper ‘The Celtic Tiger - The Great Misnomer’ (1998) I attempted to deduct
from the national expenditure accounts the contribution of the high-tech MNCs
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the nominal growth in GDP for the period 1990-1996 fell from 55% to 23%. I
stressed at the time that this was a somewhat crude technique, but it at least
highlighted the extent to which the high tech MNCs were the driving force
behind Ireland’s economic growth. More recently McCarthy (1999) using an
output approach concluded that ‘...inflows of FDI into the Irish manufacturing
sector have boosted the growth rate of the economy over the period 1993-1997
by a minimum of 2.25 % per annum. Furthermore, taking multiplier effects into
account, would at a minimum, raise this to 3 % per annum.’ Even taking
multiplier effects into account I feel McCarthy’s estimate is too low because the
success of the MNCs and more recently the IFSC have generated substantial
effects in other parts of the economy most notably the services sector. A case in
point is the housing market. Residential property prices have soared because of
the improved economic situation. Since 1993 residential and commercial
property prices have more than doubled. O’Connell and Quinn (1999) reported
‘In the Dublin area, where prices have risen fastest, the cumulative increase in
real (in excess of the Consumer Price Index) prices, during the period 1994 to
1998 was 88.4 % for new houses and 106.2 % for second-hand houses’.
Investment in property has consequently greatly increased. However, if the
MNCs and the IFSC had not been in Ireland would the property market have
boomed. Though increased investment in the construction sector may be
deemed to be a domestic activity it has, in my opinion, been induced for the
most part by the success of the MNCs and the IFSC. Remove them and the so
called ‘property market bubble’ will quickly deflate. Commentators who stress
the extent to which domestic demand components in the form of consumer and
investment expenditure have kicked in during the late 1990s to push the growth
rate upwards are missing the point. Domestic demand is buoyant because the
MNCs and IFSC have generated considerable increases in both direct and
indirect employment and boosted confidence to an unprecedented level. Here I
should express my own mea culpa in that in an earlier work (1993) I
underestimated the extent of the knock-on effects that the MNCs were about to
have on the rest of the economy.
 The story so far has emphasised the way in which the low 10% corporate
tax rate attracted MNCs into the Irish economy. But now even this low tax rate
is increasingly producing sizeable revenue gains for the Exchequer. Ten per
cent may appear to be a low rate but when it is ten per cent of sizeable and
growing profits the revenue gains to the Exchequer start accelerating. In 1990
corporation tax amounted to £475 million. By 1998 it had shot up to £2.1
billion, an increase of 335% - as against an 89% increase in income tax.
Already in the first half of 1999 corporation tax has produced £1.9 billion for
the Exchequer, so the end on year figure should show a further considerable
increase. Companies such as Intel (Pentium chips), Microsoft (Windows
software) and Pfizer (Viagra) in increasing their output, and their profitability,
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bonanza. It is little wonder that both the budget and exchequer borrowing are in
surplus and that the government debt/GNP ratio fell to 59% in 1998. In 1997
the Department of Finance estimated that 62% of the total yield of corporation
tax emanated from companies subject to the 10% rate on part or all of their
profits. Further attempts to disaggregate the amount paid by high tech MNCs,
the IFSC and by Irish companies are apparently not possible according to the
Revenue Commissioners. Using the 62% figure - and it has surely grown since
1997 - the 10% taxed MNCs were contributing £1.3 billion in corporation
profits tax to the Exchequer in 1998.
Domestic Inputs into the Growth Performance
Whilst this paper has stressed the role and importance of the high-tech MNCs in
the Irish growth performance it must also be emphasised that this success story
has many Irish components. First of all successive governments since the 1960s
have encouraged foreign direct investment in Ireland. This combined with the
Europeanisation approach has meant that Ireland is perceived by the MNCs as a
good European base from which to expand their operations. The mistakes of
prohibiting foreign investment resulting from the Control of Manufactures Acts
were belatedly learnt in the late 1950s. Since then there has been no antipathy
by the public or successive governments to foreign investment. Secondly, the
Industrial Development Authority targeted emerging high-tech companies
across a range of different sectors such as computers, computer software,
telecommunications, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and cola concentrates. The
IDA correctly identified some of the main growth areas of the future and by
targeting these sectors at an early stage of their development created important
first-mover advantages for Ireland. There is now a balanced portfolio of foreign
investment in Ireland so that if one particular company or group of companies
fails or leaves the country the effect will be more dampened than if the export
led growth was dependent on just one specific MNC sector. Thirdly, labour has
shown considerable responsibility in negotiating national pay agreements,
which has created a stable industrial relations environment. Fourthly,
investment in education has produced a solidly educated young labour force.
Fifthly, fiscal retrenchment was implemented when it was vitally necessary in
1987. This fiscal retrenchment aided by two tax amnesties, which greatly
expanded the tax base, restored equilibrium to the public finances. Indeed the
current problem is one of learning how to cope with growing budget surpluses.
Sixthly, Ireland is not a country fettered by excessive bureaucracy or regulation.
Because it is small foreign investors can have quick access to government
officials and politicians in order to sort out problems that they encounter in
establishing their companies in Ireland. On the regulatory side there has been
substantial de-regulation in two key sectors which improve the openness of the
economy - transport and telecommunications. Now thanks to the pioneering
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Europe have been greatly reduced. This has helped improve the attractiveness
of Ireland as a business location and also as a tourist centre. Deregulation of the
telecommunications sector has produced cost cutting rivals to the former
monopoly provider Telecom Eireann, which has been privatised and re-
launched as Eircom. Seventhly, there has been a belated diaspora dividend.
Since the middle of the nineteenth century up to recent years Ireland’s main
export was its people. Unlike the Jewish diaspora with its assistance for Israel
over the last fifty years, the Irish diaspora has only taken a real interest in
Ireland in recent years. John F. Kennedy identified the importance of the Irish-
American political grouping. He was followed by Richard Nixon and Ronald
Reagan, both of whom showed great keenness in identifying their Irish roots for
the purpose of garnering votes from this group. The Irish American lobby
identified Bill Clinton’s presidential ambitions at an early stage and helped him
to the Presidency. He has repaid this cooperation by his intense interest in the
peace negotiations and in his encouragement of US investment in Ireland. Now
Ireland strikes a strong resonant ethnic note for many Irish American business
people who take pride in investing in the country of their ancestors.
Conclusions
 For someone who spent nearly three decades of his professional life analysing
a poorly performing economy it is gratifying to show the very considerable
improvements and new dynamism in the Irish economy. Decade after decade I
watched nearly all of my graduating classes in Trinity emigrate. Now it is a
source of pleasure to see most graduates finding employment at home and so
many of those who emigrated returning to well paid employment in Ireland.
Success has led to more success. MNCs impressed by the performance of their
competitors in Ireland have been attracted to invest in the country. Young Irish
entrepreneurs impressed by the success of the young high-tech U.S.
entrepreneurs have started to establish their own companies geared towards the
international market. There is now a considerable buzz and effervescence in the
Irish economy.
 Ireland’s recent economic story would be one’s which emphasises the
role of low taxation in promoting economic activity. Low corporate taxes are
vital if a region is to encourage foreign direct investment. Aside from the 10%
corporation tax rate there have been substantial reductions in tax rates between
1985 and 1998. The top rate of income tax has come down from 65% to 46%,
capital gains tax has been reduced from 60% to 20% and capital acquisitions
tax from 55% to 40%. Well targeted tax breaks can generate worthwhile
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Another message would be to focus attention on the de-regulation of
government monopolies particularly in the areas of telecommunications, energy
and transport. Ryanair, the airline born in the era of de-regulation, has been an
absolute boon to Irish business and tourism. A further message would be to
encourage greater mobility of students. Most Irish students have worked abroad
in the U.S. or Europe for at least two summers prior to graduating from
university. This work experience promotes flexibility and openness which
MNCs appreciate in their labour force.
 The most important message is one which encourages participation in
the dual processes of globalisation and Europeanisation. It is a message which
states that rather than demonising and fearing these processes that they may
actually be viewed as being highly beneficial to a country such as Ireland.
Globalisation has abolished peripherality enabling people to work from the
region in which they were born. In the past during industrialisation they had to
emigrate to the large cities. In this new high-tech post-industrial world many
companies are attracted to regions such as Ireland not only because of the tax
incentives and a well educated labour force, but, also, by the quality of life
offered during leisure time. Aquatic sports, golfing, hunting, shooting, fishing,
walking, etc. can all be quickly enjoyed in our two regions rather than spending
hours in futile traffic jams. Equipped with mobiles and modems the new high-
tech post-industrial worker may produce un retour à la campagne.
Antoin E. Murphy
Department of Economics
Trinity College, Dublin.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 25
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1982            -1.7 1.3
1983            -1.2 0.1
1984 1.6 3.7
1985 1.0 2.4














*Central Bank forecast Autumn 1999.
Sources: Budgetary and Economic Statistics, Department of Finance, May 199; National Income
and Expenditure 1998.
Note: Due to the very substantial net factor income outflows - amounting to 13% of GDP in 1999
- which for the most part is caused by profit repatriation by the MNCs the GNP growth rate is
more useful the GDP growth rate as an indicator of the annual growth of the economy.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 27
Table 2. Openness of the Irish Economy 1922-1999
Year Commodities Labour Capital
1922-32 Yes Yes Yes
1932-38 No Yes No
1939-45 WAR
1945-57 Yes Yes No
1958-78 Yes Yes Yes
1978-92 Yes Yes No
1992 -  Yes Yes YesRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 28
Table 3. Manufacturing Activity in Ireland 1993-96
Net Output (£ millions)
Years 1993 1994 1995 1996
Selected High Tech 5,086 6,191 8,491 9,570
All Foreign 8,302 9,817 12,490 13,975
Irish 3,419 3,508 3,747 4,160
Total 11,721 13,325 16,237 18,135
Employment
Years 1993 1994 1995 1996
Selected High Tech 21,469 24,430 29,406 32,044
All Foreign 88,836 95,715 103,864 106,410
Irish 111,167 109,706 116,714 120,224




Years 1993 1994 1995 1996
Selected High Tech 236 253 289 299
All Foreign 93 103 120 131
I r i s h 3 13 23 23 5
T o t a l 4 76 57 48 0
Source: CIPRSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 29
Table 4.  Total Exports Breakdown 1988-1996
Export divisions 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
1. Miscellaneous edible products – cola
concentrates (09)
714 786 736 796 894 1251 1445 1744 1757
 a
2. Organic chemicals (51) 672 903 972 1158 1421 1864 2432 2502 3151
3. Medical & pharm. Equipment (54) 367 491 579 713 899 963 1238 1313 1739
4. Office/data processing machinery (75) 2264 2903 2760 2485 2609 3645 4139 5826 6384
5. Recorded media (898.79) 421 575 534 604 762 890 1393 2157 2476
 b
Total (1-5) 4438 5658 5581 5756 6585 9063 10647 13515 15507
Remainder 7867 8939 8762 9263 10044 10767 12106 13782 14878
Total/exports 12305 14597 14343 15019 16629 19830 22753 27297 30385
Source: Trade Statistics of Ireland 1988-1996.
Table 5. Total Exports: Annual Growth rates in exports
Export Divisions 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
1. Misce. edible products - cola concentrates (09) 10 -6.4 8.1 12.3 39 15.5 20.7 0.7
a
2. Organic chemicals (51) 34.4 7.6 19.1 22.7 31.1 30.4 2.8 25.9
3. Medical & pharm. Equipment (54) 33.8 17.9 23.1 26 7.1 28.5 6 32.4
4. Office/data processing machinery (75) 28.2 -5 -10 4.9 39.7 13.5 40.7 9.5
5. Recorded media (898.79) 36.5 -7.2 13.1 26.1 16.8 56.5 54.8 14.8
a
Total (1-5) 27.5 -1.4 3.1 14.4 37.6 17.5 26.9 9.5
a
Remainder 13.6 -2 5.7 8.4 7.1 12.4 13.8 10.8
a
Total/exports 18.6 -1.8 4.7 10.7 19.2 14.7 19.9 10.2
a
Source: Trade Statistics of Ireland 1988-1996.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 30
Table 6. Profit Repatriation by the MNCs
Year Dividends Reinvested Total Growth
Earnings
1990 2214   396 2610
1991 1936   602 2538 -2.8%
1992 2247   795 3042 19.9%
1993 2691   664 3355 10.3%
1994 3209   577 3786 12.9%
1995 3945 1248 5193 37.2%
1996 4454 1372 5826 12.2%
1997 6005 1389 7394 26.9%
1998 7506 1790 9296 25.7%
This table is derived from table 30a Balance of International Payments in National Income and
Expenditure 1998. It includes profits repatriated not only by the high-tech MNCs but also by
other foreign owned companies. However, it is contended by most of the outflows and, in
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Remarks
Since 1994 Ireland has produced a strong and sustained growth performance. A
great part of this has been due to the activities of the high tech MNCs and the
International Financial Services Centre. It would be wrong to say that the country
does not need these high tech MNCs and the IFSC. They play a key role in the
Irish economy and the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) appears to have
done a very good job in identifying those high tech sectors which may flourish in
Ireland. The high tech MNCs have created employment, encouraged the growth of
employment in the services sector and made substantial contributions to the
Exchequer in taxation, most notably through corporation tax.
Nevertheless the debate raises some very significant issues:
(1) Ireland’s economic performance, while impressive, is imbalanced in that
it is crucially dependent on the activities of a small group of MNCs. It must
be emphasised once again that a small group of MNCs employing less than
30,000 employees dominate a large part of Ireland’s manufacturing
performance. If some or all of these MNCs were to leave Ireland then there
is the potential for an economic implosion. The closure in Clonmel of the
Seagate Technology plant, which manufactured computer disk drives, in
December 1997, resulting in the loss of 1,400 jobs showed the potential
fragility of such high tech MNC investment.
(2) The raison d’être for these high-tech MNCs locating in Ireland is the low
rate of corporation tax. This policy is now regarded as tax dumping by some
members of the European Union. Any rapid European Union move towards
fiscal harmonisation of the corporate tax regimes could raise serious
question marks as to the long term commitment of the high-tech MNCs to
the Irish economy.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 33
The Irish Economy in the 1990s
Since Morgan Stanley coined the term the Celtic Tiger there has been a
widespread perception that Ireland had a high rate of economic growth in each
of the years of the 1990s. This has not been the case. The growth performance
in the 1990s has been quite uneven. The average for expenditure and output














a) Department of Finance estimate.
b) Central Bank forecast.
These growth rates indicate that 1990 produced a very high level of growth but
it was followed by three years of modest growth. This was an issue that was
highlighted in The Irish Economy: Celtic Tiger or Tortoise? (1994). In that
paper it was maintained that the evidence over the previous three years did not
suggest that a booming economy. Proxies for domestic demand such as retail
sales and the sales of new cars were sluggish.
Volume of Retail Sales New Private Car
Registrations
1990 2.7% 6.4%
1991            -0.1          -17.8%
1992 2.3% -1.0%
1993 1.4%          -10.4%RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 34
The first estimates for economic growth in 1991 and 1992, made in National
Income and Expenditure 1992, had indicated growth rates of 3.6% for 1991 and
3.5% for 1992. These were substantial overestimates. These growth rates have
been revised downwards in the subsequent National Income and Expenditure
accounts. The latest estimates of an economic growth rate of 2.2% in 1991 and
2.3% in 1992, along with a growth rate of 2.7% in 1993, suggest that there were
no great indications of the ‘tiger’ phenomenon between 1991 and 1993. Since
1994, however, there has been a sustained and impressive rate of economic
growth.
When writing The Irish Economy: Celtic Tiger or Tortoise three knock
on effects created by the MNCs had not fully manifested themselves. These
were (1) the critical mass effect; (2) the spillover effects into the services sector
(3) the effervescence effect on domestic expenditure. These effects have, in
recent years, come to the fore.
The success of some of the established high tech MNCs has attracted
their competitors to establish in Ireland.Success has built on success. Surveys of
executives working in the MNCs indicate that their decision to base in Ireland
was significantly influenced by the presence of their competitors in Ireland. The
critical mass effect has been reinforced by developments in the European Union
in the form of the completion of the Single Market in 1992 and the move
towards European Monetary Union. These developments brought home to US
MNCs the need to have platforms in the expanding European Union market.
Furthermore the sustained improvement in the public sector finances, started in
1987, produced a more stable macroeconomic environment which added to
Ireland’s attractiveness as a location for US MNCs.
The spillover effects have resulted in increased demand for services ranging
from legal and accounting skills to increased demand for offices and housing to
increased demand for hotel and restaurant facilities. The demand curve for
property has shifted sharply to the right due to the growth in employment and
the high incomes earned by executives employed by the MNCs and the IFSC.
With a limited supply of quality residential property coming on the market it is
not surprising to see the continued spiral in property prices.
The effervescence effect that was missing in the early 1990s has been clearly
evident in recent years. Increased consumption expenditure has become a strong
factor pushing up economic growth. Buoyant retail sales and exceptionally high
levels of new car sales suggest that the hesitant and uncertain consumer of the
early 1990s have been transformed into the confident spender of the late 1990s.
The volume of retail sales rose by 6.2% in 1996, by 7.9% in 1997 and by 8.8%
in 1998.RSC 2000/16 © 2000 Antoin E. Murphy 35
On the employment front the total number of people at work increased by
only 23,000 between 1990 and 1993. Between 1993 and 1996 the total number
of people at work increased by 146,000. Employment growth continued to surge
between 1996 and 1999 with total employment expected to average 1,576,000
in 1999, an increase of 247,000 on 1996. Unemployment is expected to average
less than 6% for 199.
Against this background it may appear inappropriate to raise question
marks about the future of the Irish economy. However, just as the Irish ‘boom’
of the 1970s was artificially based on excessive government expenditure and
borrowing, there is an imbalanced element in the boom of the 1990s in that it is
predominantly a multi-national phenomenon rather than an indigenous Irish
one.